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Case No. 200300710-CA 
Trial Court No. 021912683 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over all criminal convictions 
that do not involve a first-degree felony or a capital offense pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). Because the contested conviction is an Appeal From 
Conviction For One Count of Violating a Protective Order, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1), the Utah Court of 
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue. Did the trial judge render a guilty verdict based on an incorrect 
standard of criminal negligence, were facts from trial an impermissible 
variance from the information filed, was the evidence presented at trial 
sufficient to sustain a conviction and was the Protective Order issued against 
the Defendant unconstitutionally vague? 
Standard of Review. On appeal, State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, Tf 5; 84 P. 
3d 1167,1168, provides the correct standard of review for issues of fact. 
Gordon holds that the standard of review for findings of fact for bench trial is 
to, "sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against clear weight of 
evidence/' 
Preservation. Issues that are the basis of this appeal were the basis for 
Defendant's defense at trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 21, 2002, the Defendant was charged by information with 
one count of violating a Protective Order sexual abuse of a minor, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1). (Information). 
On April 17,2003, before Judge Paul Maughan of the Third District 
Court, the Defendant was found guilty of violating a Protective Order. (R. 89: 
49, lines 8-9). 
On June 23, 2003, Judge Maughan sentenced the Defendant to 180 days 
in jail (granting 24 days for time served and suspending the remaining 156 
days) and ordered the Defendant to pay a fine of $350. (R. 90:11, lines 20-21). 
On August 26, 2003, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On July 30, 2002 Tamara Gibson was granted a Protective 
Order shielding herself and her two daughters, R.G. and C.G., from the 
Defendant. (State's Exhibit 1) The Protective Order specifically 
prohibited the Defendant from frequenting the schools attended by his 
daughters. (State's Exhibit 1, p. 2, item 5). The Oquirrh Middle School is 
not listed by name on the Protective Order. 
On October 31,2002, the victim R.G. observed the Defendant 
waiting in his vehicle in the parking area outside of her school. (R. 89: 5, 
lines 15-22). Later that same day, R.G. again saw the Defendant passing 
by the school in his vehicle. (R. 89:10, lines 19-20). That same afternoon, 
the Defendant went to the residence of Mike Black, near the school, 
specifically because the Defendant believed R.G. was at the residence 
with Mr. Black's son. (R. 89:10, lines 22-24 and Information). 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's verdict. See State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76,11 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
i 
On July 28, 2003 Third District Judge Paul G. Maughan found the 
Defendant guilty of violating the Protective Order following a bench trial. (R. 
89: 49, lines 8-9). Judge Maughan specifically found the Defendant guilty for 
parking his car in the student drop-off area of R.G/s school. (R. 89: 49, lines 10-
13). Judge Maughan found that the testimony of R.G. that the Defendant was 
in the student drop-off area to be credible and found the Defendant's contrary 
claims not to be credible. (R. 89: 49, line 10; 50 lines 4-6). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the conviction of the Defendant was consistent with the 
Information filed. Defendant claims that the facts borne out in court stand as 
an impermissible variance from the information filed. Specifically, the 
Information filed charged Defendant with a violation of the Protective Order 
for parking at the school his daughter attended. The trial court in fact based 
the Defendant's conviction on testimony from R.G. that Defendant was parked 
at the school and convicted him on a charge consistent the Information filed. 
Second, facts presented at trial were sufficient to support the conviction. The 
trial court judge, within the discretion allowed a trier of fact, found that the 
testimony of R.G. that Defendant was parked at the school in violation of the 
Protective Order to be credible. Third, the trial court applied the correct legal 
standard of knowingly and intentionally violating the Protective Order in 
reaching the guilty verdict. Defendant claimed that he did not know his 
daughter attended the Oquirrh Hills Middle School, Judge Maughan found 
this testimony, "not to be credible". The judge found that the Defendant knew 
his daughter attended that school, and therefore when Defendant went to the 
school, he was knowingly and intentionally violating the Protective Order. 
Fourth, the Protective Order was not unconstitutionally vague. The Protective 
Order clearly prohibited the Defendant from appearing at his daughter's 
school, and the trial court found claims that Defendant didn't know where his 
daughter attended school not to be credible. Making the Protective Order 
clear enough that even the Defendant understood its implication. 
The trial court verdict in this case was supported by the evidence, 
notably the testimony of R.G. The conviction was based on a proper and clear 
Protective Order, and the correct legal standard was applied and the 
Defendant's conviction should stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED BY INFORMATION WITH 
VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER ON OCTOBER 31,2002 AT 
OQUIRRH MIDDLE SCHOOL AND THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED CONFORMED TO THE FORMAL CHARGE. 
The information charging the Defendant stated that on October 31, 2002, 
at 12949 South 2700 West, in Salt Lake County, the Defendant knowingly or 
intentionally violated a protective order that was properly served on him. At 
trial, the testimony was that on October 31, 2002, the Defendant parked his 
vehicle at 12949 South 2700 West, Oquirrh Middle School, and made contact 
with R.G. The fact that the evidence given at trial by S.G. and Mrs. Black did 
not conform to the Defendant's own belief of what the facts should be, does 
not violate the notice requirement. Furthermore, the fact that a witness was 
not called to testify at trial to incidents mentioned in the probable cause 
statement of the Information does not cause an impermissible variance. 
Therefore, based on the information, the Defendant was on sufficient notice to 
defend against the charge. 
Under Utah law, there are two sources which require a defendant to be 
given notice of the charges against him; Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and due process under the Utah constitution. Rule 4 states that an 
"information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by 
statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to 
give the defendant notice of the charge/7 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
4(b). In this case, the Information specifically stated the Defendant was being 
charged with violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108, Violation of a Protective 
Order. Accordingly he was placed on notice as to what the specific charges 
were. 
Generally, a defendant is "entitled to whatever information the 
prosecutor has that may be useful in helping to fix the date, time and place of 
the offense." State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115,118 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Rule 4(e) 
of the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure specifically states that if more 
information is required to prepare a defense, the defendant may file a bill of 
particulars. In this case, the Defendant requested, and was provided, a copy 
of the police reports and other items detailing the evidence upon which the 
prosecution would rely at trial. The Defendant has not alleged that he was 
surprised by any of the evidence. Nor did the Defendant file any bill of 
particulars. Again, there is ample evidence the Defendant was placed on 
notice that he was being charged for violating a protective order by parking at 
Oquirrh Middle School on October 31, 2002. 
Although Defendant likens his arguments to those addressed in State v. 
Burnett, these comparisons are misplaced. State v. Burnett 712 P.2d 260, 262 
(Utah 1985). Burnett was originally charged for stealing from one victim (his 
firm), then tried for stealing from other victims. That is not the case here. The 
Defendant was charged with violating a Protective Order, at Oquirrh Middle 
School on October 31,2002. The Defendant was convicted for violating a 
protective order at Oquirrh Middle School on October 31, 2002. The 
conviction was based on S.G/s testimony that Defendant was parked outside 
of the school. The Defendant's claim that "Mr. Gibson was found to have only 
been in the vicinity of the school" demonstrates his reluctance to marshal the 
evidence, as required, and goes to a sufficiency of the evidence claim, not 
notice. (Appellate Brief p.l) 
II. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND THE DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY VIOLATED A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER WHERE THE DEFENDANT PARKED AT 
R.G/S SCHOOL AND FOLLOWED HER TO A FRIEND'S HOME. 
When reviewing a trial court's finding of facts, the appellate court will 
"sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against clear weight of 
evidence." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, | 5; 84 P. 3d 1167,1168. To succeed 
when challenging a finding of fact of the trial court, the defendant "may not 
simply reargue [his] position based on selective excerpts of evidence presented 
to the trial court." ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 256 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). The Defendant must first marshal all the evidence in 
support of the guilty verdict and then show that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support a guilty verdict even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings. Id. 
When determining what the evidence is, "[tjrial courts are given 
primary responsibility for making determinations of fact." State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994), overruled on other grounds by Campbell v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,65 P.3d 1134. A reviewing court must 
"resolv[e] all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination." Id. at 936 (citing Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 
711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985)). 
A reviewing court is highly deferential to the trial court because it 
is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the 
evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to 
be in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive 
a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court 
cannot hope to garner from a cold record. 
Id. (citing In re I. Children, 664 P.2d 1158,1161 (Utah 1983)). 
In this case, the Defendant fails to marshal the evidence, and merely 
attempts to reargue his position. The trial court specifically found the 
testimony of R.G. to be more credible. (R. 89: 5). Yet, the Defendant repeatedly 
argues his version of the facts. The trial court found that the Defendant's 
claim he accidentally went to his daughter's school was not credible. 
Therefore, the facts, when looking at them in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings are: the Defendant was prohibited from frequenting schools 
attended by R.G.; the Defendant went to the school he knew R.G. was 
attending; the Defendant parked at the school; the Defendant observed R.G. 
and made eye contact with, and smiled at her (R. 89:10,19-20); the Defendant 
came back to the school; the Defendant followed R.G. to a friend's home. 
Q 
Based on these facts, there was sufficient evidence to find the Defendant 
knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL 
STANDARD WHEN IT FOUND THE DEFENDANT 
KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY CONTACTED R.G. IN 
VIOLATION OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1), requires that a person "intentionally or 
knowingly" violate a Protective Order to be found guilty. The trial court 
concluded that the Defendant did knowingly and intentionally violate the 
Protective Order. The trial judge stated that he did not believe Defendant's 
claim that he "accidentally" showed up at R.G/s school, stating, "I don't find it 
credible that you were just innocently going to [the school] - that you 
happened to be at that location at the time school was out." (R. 89: 50). The 
trial judge held that the Defendant knowingly went to R.G/s school in direct 
violation of the Protective Order. 
The Defendant's claim that the judge applied the wrong standard at trial is 
based on a conversation the Defendant had with the trial court after the trial 
court found him guilty and after the trial court made its findings of fact. The 
Defendant inquired what actions he could take to avoid violating the 
protective order in the future. (R. 89: 50). The Defendant reargued his trial 
claim that even though he knows that R.G. spends time across the street from 
in 
his house and that her school is in his neighborhood, the one thing he didn't 
know was that R.G. attended that school. The trial court reiterated its position 
that he did not believe the Defendant's claims that he was unaware R.G. 
attended school there, (R. 89: 50, 6), and then told the Defendant that he could 
not be around the school and that if he chose to take the route by the school he 
would be running a risk of violating the protective order. (R. 89: 50,17). The 
trial court refused to give an advisory opinion to the Defendant, but reiterated 
that on October 31, 2002 the Defendant did violate the protective order. The 
trial court judge was not changing the legal standard he used, but he was 
merely making a point to the Defendant as to what he should consider in the 
future. When the court stated that the Defendant, "should have known" it 
was not expressing the standard employed by the trial judge when rendering 
the guilty verdict. 
IV, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-108 IS CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE 
IT IS NARROWLY DRAWN AND RESTRICTS CONDUCT 
NECESSARY TO SERVE THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST OF 
PROTECTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. 
The Defendant asserts that the statute he was convicted of violating was 
unconstitutionally vague. Vagueness questions are procedural due process 
issues. State v. Hall 905 P.2d 899 (Utah Ct. App.1995). The Defendant has not 
preserved this argument for appeal, therefore, this argument should not be 
considered on appeal. However, even if the Defendant properly raised the 
constitutional issues, the statute under which he was convicted is 
constitutional. When determining whether a statute is constitutional, the 
Court presumes that legislative acts are constitutional, and a defendant 
challenging a statute bears a "heavy 'burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality//, State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, |8,84 P.3d 1171 (quoting 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991)). 
A. The Defendant Did Not Preserve a Constitutional 
Vagueness Argument by His Objections That He Did Not 
Know R.G. Attended Oquirrh Middle School. 
It is well settled that "Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to 
bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an 
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
361 (Utah Ct.App.l993)(quoting VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distrib., 
758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah Ct.App.1988)); see State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244 
f 14. 54 P.3d 645, 648-9. Where a defendant fails to make an argument at the 
trial court level, but raises the argument for the first time on appeal, "appellate 
courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional issue,.. . unless 
the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances/7 State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 359. 
In this case, the Defendant did not raise the constitutional vagueness 
argument to the trial court prior to, or subsequent to the guilty verdict. The 
only reference the Defendant made regarding vagueness at trial is on page 46 
of the Trial Transcript where the Defendant argued that the protective order is 
a "little vague." (R. 89: 46 line 14). There was no mention at the trial that the 
protective order was constitutionally vague. Although the Defendant claims 
he argued the statute was vague, his argument went solely to refute the mens 
rea of the prohibited conduct. He claimed that because the protective order 
did not list his daughter's school by a specific address, that he could not have 
known she was attending school there, and therefore, could not have 
"intentionally" nor "knowingly" violated the protective order. Neither 
argument implicates the constitutional doctrines of vagueness. For these 
reasons, this Court should not consider these constitutional issues for the first 
time on appeal. 
B. The Statute is Not Vague Because the Conduct Prohibited 
is Specifically Defined in the Statute and Incorporated 
Into the Protective Order. 
The Defendant continuously asserts that because the protective order 
did not specifically list the address of the school where R.G. was attending, 
that the protective order was vague. The vagueness doctrine has been applied 
to statutes only. The Defendant's argument that he could not have known he 
could not go to Oquirrh Middle School is a defense to the mens rea of 
"intentionally" or "knowingly," not a constitutional argument regarding a 
1 1 
statute. Furthermore, any argument that §76-5-108(1) is constitutionally vague 
is unsupportable. 
When a statute does not implicate constitutionally protected conduct, a 
statute is only void for vagueness where "the statute is impermissibly vague in 
all of its applications.,, State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 12, 84 P.3d 1171 
(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489,494-95,102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). If a statute is clear as 
applied to the Defendant, he cannot complain that the law is vague as applied 
to others. Only when a statute is not clear as applied to the defendant, must 
the defendant demonstrate "either (1) that the statutes do not provide 'the 
kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand what conduct [is 
prohibited]/ or (2) that the statutes 'encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement/" Id. at 113 (quoting State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, f 31, 57 P.3d 977)); 
see also Elks Lodges 719 & 2021 v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
905 P.2d at 1202. (finding "[a]n enactment will be held unconstitutionally 
vague only if the terms of the law are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary 
intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts conform to the law/'). 
In this case, the Defendant acknowledges that he knew he was not to 
contact his daughter or go to places she frequented. Therefore, the statute is 
not vague regarding him, and because it provided the Defendant notice, he 
cannot complain the law is vague on its face. 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1), places the ordinary person on 
notice that certain conduct is prohibited. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108(1) 
specifically states "[a]ny person who is the respondent or defendant subject to 
a protective order . . . who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after 
having been properly served, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor/' The statute 
specifically references Title 30, Chapter 6 to designate the process by which a 
protective order is obtained. Incorporating other sections or even regulations 
is permissible and sufficient to provide notice sufficient to overcome a 
vagueness challenge, see State v. Robinson, 2001 UT 21, |24, 20 P.3d 396. 
Therefore, any ordinary person would know that they could not intentionally 
or knowingly violate orders written in the protective order they were properly 
served with. 
Although the Defendant couches his argument in constitutional terms of 
vagueness, he is rearguing his claim that he did not intentionally or knowingly 
violate the protective order. The Defendant never argues that he was unaware 
he could not contact his daughter, as ordered by the protective order. The 
Defendant was aware of what conduct was prohibited. His claim does not 
dispute whether his behavior was prohibited, but whether he intentionally 
1 ^ 
and knowingly engaged in that behavior, which is a question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence, not vagueness. The trial court believed R.G/s testimony and 
held that the Defendant did know his daughter attended school at Oquirrh 
Middle School and went there intentionally and knowingly. See supra Part III. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court decision was proper and the judge acted within his legal 
authority when he (1) relied on Rachel's testimony and not the Defendant's 
due to credibility concerns, (2) applied the criminal standard of knowingly 
and intentionally, and (3) convicted the Defendant on trial findings consistent 
with the information filed. 
The Protective Order against the Defendant was not overly broad. The 
Protective Order clearly forbids the Defendant from frequenting his 
daughter's school and the trial court held that the Defendant did in fact know 
that his daughter went to Oquirrh Middle School. In the case at hand, 
avoiding the school does not burden the Defendant's constitutional rights. 
After weighing the testimony of the witnesses, the fact-finder believed 
testimony of the victim and not the Defendant. With a lack of "clear and 
weighty" evidence to the contrary, this is not a finding that can be overturned. 
A trial court does not overstep its discretion when finding one witness more 
credible than another. The trial court found that the Defendant appeared at 
the school he knew his daughter to attend twice, thus he knowingly and 
intentionally violated his Protective Order. 
The Defendant knowingly and intentionally violated a sound and 
sufficiently clear Protective Order. Therefore the State asks this court to 
uphold the Defendant's conviction for violating the Protective Order and deny 
this appeal. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's conviction on one count of violating 
a Protective Order by the trial court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on this 5th day of August 2004. 
DAVID YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
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